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IN DEFENSE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF EXPERTS
Ronald L. Carlson*
Professor Ronald Allen honors the memory of John Henry Wig-
more on virtually every occasion in which he targets an aspect of evi-
dence law for scholarly study.1 As Wigmore Professor of Law, Allen has
consistently afforded modem evidence specialists some of the best in pro-
vocative theory as grist for review and discussion. He now places experts
in his sights, and the results are no less stimulating.
I. CORRECTLY IDENTIFYING THE POSITIONS
Professor Allen and Mr. Miller commence their review of the cur-
rent writings on experts by dissecting several of my articles.2 Happily,
the distillation of central points by Allen and Miller is clear and accurate.
Because earlier commentators have confused my thesis, briefly restating
the contentions seems advisable.
An expert forms conclusions based upon a variety of sources. In
many cases an expert relies on a combination of factors consisting of the
general theories, research, and studies in her field; hands-on experience
with the person or process at issue in the litigation; and information
drawn from out-of-court declarants who provide specific input regarding
the expert's particular case. Frequently these declarants do not appear to
testify. While the expert can state opinions based on nonrecord informa-
tion if it is appropriately credited, the expert's detailed rendition of the
case-specific hearsay drawn from out-of-court sources is barred.
I oppose attributing evidentiary status to such supporting data un-
less there is a sound and independent ground to admit the material. 3
* John Byrd Martin Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1956, Augustana College;
J.D. 1959, Northwestern University (Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); LL.M. 1961, Georgetown
University (E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).
1 My admiration of Wigmore is identified, among other places, in Ronald L. Carlson, Compe-
tency and Professionalism in Modern Litigation: The Role of the Law Schools, 23 GA. L. REv. 689,
713 n.88 (1989).
2 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Edu-
cation?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131, 1134-37 (1993).
3 See Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion Testi-
mony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 870-71 (1992) ("The materials in the case-specific category may be
used by the testifying physician to reach a conclusion, but are particularly subject to exclusion when
admission is sought without foundation.").
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Since 1984 1 have opposed such classification without regard to whether
the proponent offers the data as substantive evidence or as a simple ex-
planation to the jury of the material relied upon by the expert.4
In the face of this position, one article made an unexpected asser-
tion:
Compounding the absurdity of the approach supported by Professor Carl-
son is the court's allowing the expert to recite the underlying basis, and
then instructing the jury not to accept the recited facts as true (even though
the expert did), but to consider those facts only in assessing the value of the
expert's opinion.5
The article also pointed out that, for the limited purpose of explaining
the expert's opinion, courts "permit the introduction of this otherwise
inadmissible background information."' 6 It then adds: "Professor Carl-
son, however, supports this result. . .. -"7 This is not correct. I have
consistently opposed the introduction of otherwise inadmissible back-
ground information whether offered directly or in the guise of justifying
the expert's opinion.8
Allen and Miller get it right. They identify various positions cur-
rently used to govern experts, including this one: "The data [in the par-
ticular case upon which an expert bases an opinion] are not admissible
and may only be referred to in a quite cursory fashion on direct examina-
tion, which is Carlson's preference." 9
Where this approach is rigorously applied-and I argue that it must
be so applied to prosecution proof in criminal cases-precious little need
arises for specially instructing juries. Juries need not be told to view vo-
luminous supportive material as illustrative or explanatory evidence.
The rule bars admission of such stuff, whatever the form of offer.
My adherence to this position has drawn criticism. Allen and
Miller conclude that "Carlson ostensibly wants to bend the world of ex-
perts to fit the law rather than expand the law to accommodate the ex-
perts." 10 Not entirely. Sensible compromises can and have been made.
In keeping with good expert witness practice, Federal Rule of Evidence
703 allows the expert to synthesize the primary source material-be it
4 Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Introduc-
tion of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 244-45 (1984).
5 Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to
Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. RaV. 583, 585 (1987).
6 Id. at 584.
7 Id.
8 See, eg., Carlson, supra note 4. See also Commonwealth v. Kendall, 399 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1980), cited in Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39
VAND. L. REv. 577, 585 n.27 (1986).
9 Allen & Miller, supra note 2, at 1134 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
10 Id.
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hearsay or not-into properly admissible evidence in opinion form.11
The balance struck by the Rule, allowing opinion testimony by the expert
but disallowing wholesale introduction of his underlying data, seems
appropriate.
Another reasonable balance was reached in a Minnesota innovation.
Concerned about the possibilities of abuse under Rule 703, Minnesota
rule drafters created a new Rule 703(b):
(b) Underlying expert data must be independently admissible in order to be
received upon direct examination; provided that when good cause is shown
in civil cases and the underlying data is particularly trustworthy, the court
may admit the data under this rule for the limited purpose of showing the
basis for the expert's opinion. Nothing in this rule restricts admissibility of
underlying expert data when inquired into on cross-examination. 12
II. THE CONSTITUTION IGNORED?
Why does the Minnesota provision except only civil cases from the
doctrine of absolute exclusion of case-specific data? Criminal prosecu-
tions are invariably subjected to the portion of the Minnesota Rule that
bars an expert's underlying data. Unless independently authenticated, a
prosecutor may not introduce the data on direct examination, not even to
simply illustrate the expert's basis. The answer, of course, lies in the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. 13 A contrary
practice would decimate the tenets of that valued provision of the Sixth
Amendment. A contrary practice would authorize a local witness on the
stand to read into the record or to give to the jury as an exhibit such
evidence as a nontestifying expert's written report about the defendant's
sanity or conclusions drawn from a DNA test performed by someone else
at a distant lab. Proponents of wide-open admission of underlying data
seem to say that such abuses are appropriate because the jury should
know, in detail, the data that supports the courtroom expert's opinion.
But they say little about the case law which condemns the patent uncon-
stitutionality of the practice they endorse.14
III. A RISING TIDE OF OPINION
Comprehensive writings on the misuse of case-specific reports pre-
pared by hearsay declarants began in about 1984. Few litigated cases
had isolated the issue at that time. With increased attention to the prob-
11 This formulation was adapted from language in United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th
Cir. 1975).
12 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 50 (West Supp. 1993).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The case of State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982), is cited in
Roger C. Park, Confining the Expert: Rule 703(b) of the Rules of Evidence, BENCH & B. OF MINN.,
Mar. 1990, at 33, 34.
14 See, e.g., State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982) (courtroom expert's recitation of the
nontestifying doctor's opinion violated Sixth Amendment).
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lem, courts began to react, many in a commendable fashion, as illustrated
by the decision in First Southwest Lloyds Insurance Co. v. MacDowell.1
The plaintiffs sued on a fire insurance policy and the insurance company
refused to pay, alleging arson. A fire marshal testified to his opinions
that the fire was set and that the plaintiffs had done it. The trial court
excluded the fire marshal's testimony concerning a spectator's specific
statements made to the marshal that served as a partial basis for the mar-
shal's conclusions. While the trial court allowed the marshal to state
that an account of the fire by the witness contributed to his conclusion
that the cause of the fire was incendiary, it refused to allow him to state
before the jury the specifics of what the witness had told him, "namely
that [the witness] had seen the fire begin from a nightclub across the
street from the beauty supply and that a white male ran from the front of
the beauty supply and sped away in a vehicle." 16
The reviewing court approved exclusion of the hearsay report sup-
plied by the out-of-court witness:
[W]hile an expert in an arson case could properly state that he based his
conclusion that a fire was incendiary upon many years of fire investigation
training and experience, the physical findings at the fire scene, and reports
made to him during the course of the investigation, he would not necessar-
ily be entitled to express all the details of each of the bases of his opinion. If
the expert were held to be entitled to detail every statement made to him
that contributed to his conclusion, then the expert could be effectively used
to present an infinite amount of evidentiary matters to the jury. 17
The common law approach to this sort of problem required that
15 769 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
16 Id. at 957.
17 Id. at 958. Texas courts have also addressed the issue of whether a party waives his objection
to underlying data when he does not object to the expert's statement of his opinion but rather objects
for the first time when an underlying report is offered in evidence. Holding against waiver is Beavers
v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("The better
judicial position is not to allow the affirmative admission of otherwise inadmissible matters merely
because such matters happen to be underlying data upon which an expert relies."). Other authorities
have appreciated the difference between an expert's opinion and inadmissible underlying data. See
State v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("We reject the notion that the
expert may be used as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence."); Federal
Rules of Evidence. A Fresh Review and Evaluation, 120 F.R.D. 299 (1987); Peter J. Rescorl, Com-
ment, Fed. R. Evid. 703: A Back Door Entrance for Hearsay and Other Inadmissible Evidence: A
Time for a Change?, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 543 (1990); see also David L. Faigman, Struggling to Stop the
Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REv. 877, 889 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1 (1988). In applying the theory espoused in the writings of Carlson and Imwinkelried, courts may
differentiate learned treatises and general points of scientific theory from case-specific information
drawn from sources involved in the particular case at issue. It is material of the latter sort that
courts need to be alert to, and to prohibit, unless independently authenticated.
This Essay seeks to make clear the fallacy of allowing an in-court expert to intensively refer to a
variety of inadmissible data, and then instruct the jury to disregard its substantive effect and to
consider it only for the purpose of crediting the expert's opinion. Professor Imwinkelried also identi-
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bystanders or eyewitnesses appear before the court, give their testimony,
and stand for cross-examination. Eliminating the last step by filtering a
witness's testimony through an expert was prohibited. That ancient ap-
proach still makes good sense to me.18 Any rule that invites the abusive
practice of insulating a key eyewitness from interrogation should be
rejected.
IV. CONCLUSION
Allen and Miller cast the great experts controversy as one of educa-
tion versus deference. 19 Those favoring deference may remind opponents
that deference only comes after the court educates itself on the reliability
of the data underlying the expert's opinion, as well as the quality of the
expert's credentials. Unaddressed by some proponents of education are
constitutional restraints. The issue in the experts controversy is not un-
duly complex. A police detective is not allowed to repeat in court every-
thing that informants and underworld sources may have told her, thus
implicating a defendant. Neither is a prosecution expert entitled to relate
what other out-of-court experts stated about scientific tests that suggest
guilt, sanity, or other conclusions. Presumably, those espousing the
wide-open view of admission of underlying data would permit this evi-
dence. Given the penchant of rule drafters to adopt uniform evidence
rules for both civil and criminal cases, proponents of the wide-open view
can only have their approach taken seriously after they analyze how their
view will impact the cases enforcing the Confrontation Clause.20
The confrontation guarantee is, of course, directly applicable in
criminal cases. Many of the thoughtful policies underlying that Clause
also make good sense in the general run of civil cases, enforced by the
hearsay rule. The Fifth Circuit said in an important decision that "it is
time to take hold of expert testimony in federal trials. ' '21 An excellent
place to start is by avoiding a "let it all in" philosophy, which dictates
virtually uncontrolled admission of background information disclosed to
an expert through a variety of sources.
Appellate courts are just now addressing the problem. For that rea-
fies the inability to cure this sort of problem with limiting instructions. Imwinkelreid, supra, at 12,
26.
18 I take this stand even while approving a modem approach to the separate question of the
opinion itself, one which allows the expert to synthesize the primary source material into properly
admissible evidence in opinion form.
19 Allen & Miller, supra note 2, at 1137.
20 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court allows hearsay into evidence
over a confrontation objection when the hearsay falls within an established and "firmly rooted"
exception to the rule. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). It can hardly be argued that an expert's
underlying basis falls within the definition of a longstanding and established hearsay exception. Such
an exception is not even listed among those which are recognized in Rules 803 or 804 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
21 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
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son, this issue and others raised by Allen and Miller are extremely
timely. On the significant question of whether a courtroom expert's reli-
ance on reports of others magically makes those reports admissible, the
response should be an emphatic no. Any other response violates the
hearsay rule and, in criminal cases, the Confrontation Clause.
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